Generational Economics in a Changing World

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Abstract

We use data from National Transfer Accounts and anthropological studies to measure intergenerational transfers in populations spanning the range from hunter-gatherers to rich industrial nations. Across this range there is a fundamental change in the direction of net intergenerational transfers from downward (from older to younger ages) to upward, with most of the change driven by population aging in the later part of the most advanced demographic transitions. Changes in the shape of the economic life cycle also contribute: old age consumption rises relative to other adult consumption. At the same time, expenditures per child on human capital rise as the number of children per couple falls. It seems likely that the growing role of the welfare state played an important role in promoting these changes in the economic life cycle. In particular, heavy public transfers to the elderly have become common, even in some Third World countries, and these have largely replaced familial support for the elderly and perhaps promoted downward net transfers from elders to their descendants. Within the family, net transfers are strongly downward in every population we observe.
Introduction

Across the developed world, generous welfare state programs for the elderly together with projected doublings or more in the proportion old, have led to political struggles which sometimes pit younger generations against the elderly (for example, for the US, see the New York Times, 2009). It may be helpful to put the current situation in historical and institutional context, which is the goal of this paper. We will begin by considering research on hunter gatherer groups, and then turn to results from the National Transfer Accounts project, a large international collaborative effort.

Human hunter-gatherer offspring have an exceptionally long period of immaturity and nutritional dependency, lasting until around age 20, judging by studies of contemporary groups (Kaplan, 1994; Hill and Hurtado, 2009; Howell, 2010). Adults at all ages up to 70 or so produced more calories than they consumed on average, contributing their surplus to feed the young.

The demographic transition began many thousands of years after hunting and gathering was displaced by agriculture as the dominant form of production technology and social organization. The demographic transition eventually led to a much reduced proportion of children in the population, and a very much increased proportion of elderly. Given the intergenerational transfer patterns of hunter gatherers that we just described, including the net productivity of the elderly, one would have expected that population aging would relax the social budget constraint, as the ratio of adults to children soared. But a funny thing happened along the way: societies invented retirement, older people became increasingly dependent on younger adults, and the economic consequences of population aging are now viewed with alarm.

This paper will explore the interaction of the transition’s changing population age distributions with the changing organization of the economic life cycle and with differing institutional arrangements. We draw on estimates by twenty three country teams participating in the National Transfer Accounts project. The researchers are identified and more detailed information is available for many countries in working papers on the NTA website: www.ntaccounts.org. We will see that the direction of intergenerational transfers in the population has shifted from downward to upward, at least in a few leading rich nations. This sea change has resulted in part from the changing economic role of the elderly, which is closely tied to the rise of the welfare state and the increasing importance of assets, and in part from the population aging brought by the demographic transition. Despite the change in the net direction of resource flows, investment in the health and education per child has risen relative to incomes, in association with fertility decline.

The degree to which these changes have occurred varies across levels of economic development, broad regions of the world, and the idiosyncratic institutions of particular countries. It is well known, however, that the systems of public transfers to the elderly as currently structured will not be fiscally sustainable as populations age strongly in the first half of the 21st century. Structural reforms will occur and in some cases have already
been made, and the upshot is likely to be a reversal in the trend toward earlier retirement and related changes.

**Theoretical Background**

A great deal of theory is relevant for interpreting patterns of intergenerational transfers, and here we will just briefly mention a few themes that appear particularly relevant. Evolutionary theory explains the co-evolution of the long period of juvenile dependency, large brain, food acquisition strategy, short birth intervals, and long life including a long post-reproductive life span during which elders provide support and food transfers for the young (Kaplan 1994; Kaplan and Robson 2002; Hawkes et al. 2005; Hrdy 2009; Chu and Lee 2006; Lee 2003, 2008). Elders remained net producers until near death, transferring their surplus output to the young. Presumably our emotional apparatus evolved to motivate this behavior. This emotional apparatus is taken as given by economic theories of the family, which start with a utility function expressing parental affection for children, and a parental desire to invest in their children’s human capital. However, the altruism of parents toward their children is limited by a concern for their own consumption and wellbeing (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Willis, 1973; Becker and Barro, 1988; Willis, 1987; Nerlove et al, 1987; Razin and Sadka, 1995).

Within this basic framework, a variety of patterns of intergenerational transfers can be generated by varying the institutional, technological, and cultural contexts (Willis, 1987 and 1994). When the rate of return to children’s human capital is low, parents choose to have more children while investing less in each. Once technological progress raises the rate of return to education, the limited altruism of parents can lead them to invest less than the optimal amount in their children’s education (Becker and Murphy, 1988). When there are cultural or institutional means of compelling adult children to repay their elderly parents for earlier investments exceeding those motivated by altruism, then parents will invest more in children’s human capital as a loan, and be supported by them in old age. When such cultural and institutional supports are lacking, human capital investment may be too low, and then there is a role for the public sector to introduce public education packaged with public sector support of the elderly through pensions (Becker and Murphy, 1988).

It is central to these themes that parents choose a preferred balance of their own lifetime consumption and that of their children, a balance that reflects their limited altruism. If the public sector provides overly generous pension payments, for example, than elderly parents may partially offset the pensions by making larger private transfers to their grand children and adult children, perhaps as bequests at death or as inter vivos transfers: help with the mortgage on a house, or grandchildren’s education, for example. Similarly, private expenditures on education may be reduced when public education is introduced. In this way, public transfers may crowd out some private transfers but “crowd in” others.

**Age Profiles of Labor Income and Consumption**

Our starting point is estimated age profiles of labor income and consumption. These estimates are averages across males and females in the population at a given age. For labor income, individuals are counted whether they generate income or not. Income
includes pretax wages and salaries, fringe benefits paid by the employer, income accruing to unpaid family labor, and two thirds of “mixed” or self-employment income (one third is assumed to accrue to property or capital). Estimates derive from pre-existing surveys, and the levels of the estimated profiles are adjusted so that, taken together with the population age distribution, they are consistent with the totals given in National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). For further details, see Lee, Lee and Mason 2008 and Mason et al. 2009. For hunter-gatherer populations, labor income is estimated as average food calories acquired at each age, drawing on estimates by anthropologists (for details see Kaplan 1994 and Howell 2010).

The age profile of consumption is again an average of male and female consumption at each given age, and includes both private consumption and in-kind government transfers, most notably for public education, health care, and long term care. In household surveys, private expenditures on health and on education may be reported for individual household members, or may be available only for the household as a whole, in which case they can often be reliably allocated by age. Other private expenditures for each household are allocated to individual household members using Equivalent Adult Consumer weights which start at 0.4 for those age 4 and younger and rise to 1.0 for age 20 and above. The individual estimates are then tabulated to estimate the age profile of other private consumption. Estimated private expenditures on health, on education, and on other consumption are adjusted to be consistent with NIPA. For details see Lee et al. (2008) and Mason et al. (2009). For hunter-gatherers, total food production is calculated separated for each sharing group (which could be a collection of households, or a larger group). It is then allocated to the individuals in the sharing group in proportion to standard caloric need tabulations by age, sex, and sometimes body weight and level of physical activity (Kaplan 1994). Howell (2010) uses a variant of this approach.¹

To ease comparison, we have formed an unweighted average of the Kaplan and Howell hunter-gatherer age profiles, which in any case are very similar. We have also made an unweighted average of the profiles for four of the lowest income countries in our NTA collection: Kenya, Indonesia, Philippines and India. Finally, we have formed an average of four of the richest countries in NTA: Japan, the US, Sweden and Finland. In order to make the shapes of the age schedules visually comparable, we adjusted the level by dividing by the average level of labor income across the ages 30 to 49, chosen to be affected neither by educational enrollment nor by early retirement.² The resulting age profiles are plotted in Figure 1.

First, we note the close similarity of the hunter-gatherer consumption age schedule and that of the poor countries. Although there are some differences, such as the decline in consumption at older ages in the hunter-gatherer profile but not in the poor country profile, these may well be due to differences in the methods and assumptions used to estimate these. For example, the caloric need tables indicate a decline in old age whereas the equivalent adult consumer weights we use assume no change in adulthood. The slightly lower consumption schedule for hunter-gatherers, relative to the labor income schedule, reflects the higher fertility and younger age distribution among the Amazon Basin hunter-gatherers. The less favorable support ratio leads to lower consumption for
all. In addition, hunter-gatherers have little or no non-labor income, and non-labor income in these estimated profiles is zero by construction.

The strongest contrast is between the consumption schedule for hunter-gatherers and poor countries, on the one hand, and the rich countries on the other. We note the strikingly higher level of child consumption up to the late teen years in the rich countries, reflecting primarily the heavy investment in education in these countries. We also note that in the rich countries, the level of consumption increases with age in the adult years, and is highest at the very highest ages. This increase is in large part due to the heavy expenditures on health care for the elderly, which rise with age, and which are largely funded by the public sector. At the highest ages, above 80, the rapid increase reflects the costs of long term care. But publicly funded health care and long term care are not the whole story. In the US, at least, private consumption also rises with age until around age 60. It seems likely that this increase in private consumption with age reflects the separate living arrangements of the elderly in the rich countries, and perhaps more fundamentally reflects a decline in private intergenerational sharing, in contrast to the poor and hunter-gatherer groups where private consumption is shared across the ages within co-residential or sharing groups. These separate living arrangements are in turn fostered by the shift towards public transfers to the elderly.

The labor income schedules also reveal interesting differences. The relative contributions of teen agers are much greater in the hunting and gathering groups. It appears that the age schedule is similar in shape to the other groups but displaced three or four years to the left, indicating an earlier start. The poor countries also show greater labor contributions by children than in the rich countries, but by a surprisingly small amount. We believe this smaller difference reflects low wages among young agricultural workers and the great importance of the nonagricultural labor force which generally has much higher incomes and which has higher enrollment rates and therefore starts work later than in the agricultural areas. Preliminary estimates for some African countries suggest that rates of employment and labor income may be very low for young adults who are not in school in urban settings, as well.

We also note that labor income peaks around age 40 in the poor countries, at around 50 in the rich countries, and is quite flat among hunter-gatherers from 40 to 60. Labor income drops precipitously in the rich countries, particularly in the early 60s, reflecting retirement facilitated by pensions and motivated by the incentives for early retirement built into their structures (Gruber and Wise 1999) and an increase in the demand for leisure (Costa 1998). In poor countries, we also see an initial rapid decline but then labor income continues well into the later years. This pattern may be due to averaging together incomes of those in the urban areas and modern sector with those in the rural areas where older people continue to work. Finally, we note the striking pattern for hunter-gatherers, who continue to work productively into old age. The data for the Amazon Basin groups include almost no one beyond age 70, but Howell reports that the !Kung continue to produce about what they consume up to around age 80 (Howell, 2010, Figure 5.6).
The net effect of these differences in the age schedules of consumption and labor income can be seen clearly by plotting consumption minus labor income, which we call the “life cycle deficit”, or LCD. This is done for the three populations in Figure 2. The positive values indicate that more is consumed than is produced at those ages, hence the deficit is positive. The LCD is smaller for young hunter-gatherers due to their earlier productivity and the absence of market inputs for education, training and health care. In all three populations, adults have a negative LCD, that is they produce more than they consume and reallocate the surplus to others. What is most noticeable, however, is that in the rich and poor countries, this adult LCD begins to move toward zero after age 45, and turns positive around age 60, whereas in the hunter-gatherer groups the LCD remains quite strongly negative until end of observation at age 70 (after which it drops to zero in the !Kung data). This is driven in part by the reduction in labor income at older ages and in part by the increase in old age consumption. In addition, consumption in rich countries is funded by asset income to a greater extent which has shifted the consumption curve up relative to labor income. We also see that the LCDs in both childhood and old age have increased strongly over time/development. These changes in the economic lifecycle are central to understanding how intergenerational flows have evolved over the development process.

Before turning to this issue a number of features of these estimates require discussion. The level of the LCD curve is governed by a social budget constraint - total outflows cannot exceed total inflows. Were labor income the only inflow and consumption the only outflow, the population weighted sum of the LCD curve would necessarily equal zero and the level of the LCD curve in Figure 2 would depend only on population age structure. This is assumed to be the case in the construction of the profiles for hunter-gatherer populations. For contemporary economies, however, other economic mechanisms can be used to fund lifecycle deficits. First, the lifecycle deficit can be funded by relying on assets – using asset income or dis-saving. Second, the LCD can be funded relying on net transfers from abroad, e.g., remittances and foreign aid. The higher level of the LCD profiles for poor and rich countries as compared with hunter-gatherer populations, reflect the increased reliance on assets by almost every contemporary population and by reliance on net foreign transfers by many poor populations.

Often in this paper we refer to the “life cycle”, which suggests longitudinal patterns, but in fact all the estimates we present are cross-sectional, referring to different ages in the same calendar year. It is possible cross-sections may affect some of the profiles’ features, particularly in populations experiencing rapid economic growth. For a number of our countries we do have long series of these cross sectional estimates from which longitudinal life cycles can be constructed, but we will not discuss these data here.

Probably the most serious shortcoming of the estimates is that they do not include the value of time spent in home production, other than standard measures of unpaid family labor and self employment income. This means that we count consumption of market-provided education, health care, and long term care, whether publicly or privately funded, but do not count the value of similar services provided privately by the family. Nor do we count the value of non-market time spent rearing children, preparing meals, cleaning and
other domestic tasks. Where data permit, it would be very useful to include time in our accounts, but our project resources have already been stretched to the limit in preparing the current version of the accounts. For an example of accounts including time, see the case of Thailand (Phananiramai 2008), early estimates for the US (Lee and Lapkoff 1988), a study of Mayan subsistence agriculturalists (Lee and Kramer 2002) and a reanalysis of Caine’s data for a poor village in Bangladesh (Roberston, Lee and Kramer, 2008).

Lifecycle wealth and the Direction and Scale of Generational Flows

We have begun our analysis by considering the economic lifecycle because intergenerational transfers and other generational flows are the counterpart of the lifecycle. The purely cross-sectional perspective we have employed to this point is incomplete, however. It tells us how resources are being allocated between different generations at a point in time, but further analysis is needed to understand how features of the economic lifecycle influence the allocation of resources across successive generations. This requires a generational perspective and for that reason we introduce two important concepts: lifecycle wealth and one of its components – transfer wealth.

To understand these concepts consider first the relationship between the old-age lifecycle deficit and the demand for lifecycle wealth. In the absence of intergenerational transfers, individuals would have to accumulate assets during their working years on which they would rely during retirement. Per capita assets would rise with age and then at some point begin to decline. For the population as a whole the demand for per capita assets would depend on the asset profile that corresponds to the lifecycle deficit and the age distribution of the population.

The one-to-one relationship between the lifecycle deficit and the demand for assets is readily extended to include reliance on intergenerational transfers to fund the lifecycle deficit. During working years individuals contribute to a public transfer system and later, in retirement, they receive benefits. From the perspective of the individual, the transfer system is a form of wealth equal to the present value of benefits to be received in the future less payments to be made. Transfer wealth increases as an individual passes through the working years and then declines as he or she proceeds through retirement drawing down lifetime benefits.

Transfer wealth is different from assets in a very important way. Assets are created through investment, raising the productive potential of an economy. Transfer wealth is purely a social obligation. There is no physical counterpart to transfer wealth, only a commitment to fulfill a social contract. For current retirees the obligation falls on those who are currently contributing. But for the current population, taken in its entirety, transfer wealth is an obligation born by future generations. The counterpart of transfer wealth is implicit debt passed on to descendants.

Now consider the lifecycle deficit during childhood. By relying on transfers to fund the lifecycle deficit of children we create an obligation on the part of the current population to provide resources to support current children and future generations (during their
The present value of net transfers to future generations by the current population is equal to downward transfer wealth. Total transfer wealth is equal to the sum of downward transfer wealth – a negative value – and upward transfer wealth – a positive value. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these two values transfer wealth is either positive or negative and future generations are gaining or losing from existing transfer systems.

Lifecycle wealth is the combined value of asset and transfer wealth. To explore the relationship between the economic lifecycle and lifecycle wealth we will switch our focus to take into account the population age distribution so that we can view the scale and direction of flows in the aggregate population and economy. To do this, we multiply the population age distribution by the age profiles to calculate the aggregate consumption and labor income by age, and their difference, the aggregate LCD (in contrast to the per capita profiles in Figures 1 and 2). The information contained in these aggregate age profiles can be summarized using arrow diagrams which indicate the direction and distance across age of transfers and asset operations, and their volume or relative importance.

We will illustrate the construction of these arrow diagrams for Indonesia in 2002 (Maliki forthcoming). Indonesia is one of the lowest income countries in our collection, but in 2002 it was well along in the fertility transition with a TFR of about 2.6, and had 8.3% of its population age 65 and over. Panel A of Figure 3 plots the per capita age profiles of consumption and labor income. Panel B plots the population age distribution in 2002. Panel C plots the age profiles for aggregate consumption and labor income that result from multiplying the per capita age profiles time the population age distribution. The simple sums across ages of these aggregate profiles shown in Panel C equal total consumption and total labor income as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) for Indonesia in 2002, by construction.

In Panel C we can see at what age each unit of consumption is consumed, and from this information we can calculate the age at which the average unit is consumed, and similarly for labor income. The average age of consumption is calculated by multiplying each age (e.g. 23) times aggregate consumption at that age and then summing these products over all ages. This sum is then divided by the total amount of consumption at all ages. The results of these mean age calculations for Indonesia are indicated by vertical lines in Panel C. It is evident that these average ages abstract from a great deal of interesting information, reducing it to a single number, but we will see these average ages are nonetheless useful and informative.

We can then compare the average age of consumption, \( A_c \), to the average age of labor income, \( A_y \). If every individual simply consumed 100% of her labor income at each age, then we would have \( c(x) = y_l(x) \), \( C(x) = Y_l(x) \), and therefore \( A_c = A_y \): the average ages would be identical. The same would be true if the aggregate deficit at young ages \( (C(x)-Y_l(x)) \) were exactly offset by the deficit in old age. But neither of these situations is likely to occur. If \( A_c > A_y \) it means that the average unit of output is shifted upwards from the lower age at which it was earned to the higher age at which it was consumed,
and if $A_c < A_{yl}$ then the average direction of shifting is downwards, from older to younger. If only a small amount of income is shifted, then there will be only a small effect on the average age of consumption, and the average ages will still be close together.

In the case of Indonesia, we see in Panel C that $A_c < A_{yl}$. Indeed, the average age of consumption is 6.8 years younger than the average age of labor income. The arrow therefore points to the left toward younger ages in the negative direction. The width of the arrow, equal to per capita consumption normalized by dividing by average labor income ages 30-49, is equal to 0.61, that is per capita consumption is about 60% of the average labor income of a prime age adult. The area of the arrow is $-6.8 \times 0.61 = -4.2$. The interpretation is that over his/her remaining life, the average Indonesian in 2002 expects to consume less than he/she produces by an amount equal to 4.2 years worth of labor income (in survival weighted present value). It is in this sense that the average person holds negative transfer wealth. The reason is that on average, labor income will be used to support children’s consumption in the future to a greater extent than the labor income of others or own assets will be used to support future consumption in old age.

The area of the arrow measures the demand for lifecycle wealth per capita (relative to average labor income) needed to achieve the consumption profile given the labor income profile, under steady state conditions with a discount rate equal to the growth rate of population plus the productivity growth rate. This was first shown by Willis 1988, and further developed in Lee 1994a.

The area of the arrow lumps together transfer wealth and asset wealth. In this paper we will largely ignore assets and concentrate on transfers and transfer wealth. Since actual populations and economies are unstable and non-steady state, and since discount rates are generally different than the population growth rate plus productivity growth rate, the area of the arrow only approximates the demand for lifecycle wealth.

The width of the arrow is per capita consumption divided by labor income. This may differ considerably from country to country. In China, with a low value of 0.44, a very high proportion of income is saved, so consumption is low relative to labor income, and the arrow is thin. In countries with low saving rates, high support ratios reflecting favorable population age distributions, high remittance income, or high asset income including from extractive industries, consumption may be considerably greater than labor income, so the arrow is fat. The highest values are found in Mexico (0.77) and the United States (0.71).

With this background, we can turn to Figure 4 which plots arrows for 23 countries plus two hunter-gatherer groups. We might expect the arrows to cluster in regional patterns, in part because the demography shares features within regions, and in part because regionally similar cultures shape the life cycle. The countries are grouped into four broad regions: Europe/US; East Asia; Latin America; and South and Southeast Asia. These regions are arranged in order of per capita GDP, with the highest first. Within each
region, the member countries are also ordered by per capita GDP, except for the hunter-gatherer groups. The un-weighted averages for the regions are shaded gray.

Two features of the chart are visually striking. First, we see that the arrows for the hunter-gatherer groups and the poorer countries at the bottom of the chart all point to the left and are long, indicating strongly downward net transfers from older to younger in these populations. The length of the arrows tends to decline as we move up the figure, ending with short arrows at the top, some pointing slightly down and some slightly up, indicating that net transfers are no longer strongly from older to younger. The regional average arrows also follow this pattern, with the arrow for the average European/US region pointing very slightly to the right, indicating net transfers to the elderly. Second, we see that the stack of arrows, broad at the base, is tilted to the right. The richer countries toward the top are also older, so both ends of the arrows are also older and farther to the right. The mean age of making and receiving transfers is older in older populations.

For five countries the arrows point to the right: Germany, Austria, Japan, Slovenia, and Hungary. For another three countries the arrows are only very slightly to the left, by less than a year: Sweden, Finland, Spain. We note that there are nine countries in our data set in which more than 15% of the population is 65 or over, and that all five of our upward arrows come from this group, as do all three of our short downward arrows. The US, which is the richest country, has only about 12% of its population 65+ and has a downward pointing arrow, similar to Uruguay—which, although relatively poor, has the same proportion 65+ as does the US. Kenya, with the youngest population, also has the most downward pointing arrow. This suggests that the population age distribution has an important influence on the length and direction of the arrows, a possibility we will investigate below.

Our leading goal here is to deepen our understanding of these cross-sectional patterns and apparent historical changes, and their relation to the demographic transition and the population aging it eventually brings about. The direction of flows results in part from the population age distribution, since higher proportions of the young or the old tilt the aggregate flows toward that age group. Thus population aging makes arrows less downward or more upward. However, the shapes of the age profiles of consumption and labor income also play an important role. These shapes are influenced by individual incentives, culture and institutional contexts, and most particularly by the growth of the public sector and its transfer programs.

We may begin our exploration by probing the role of population age distribution in shaping the pattern we observed in Figure 4. To do this, we calculate the unweighted average population age distribution for all 23 countries in our current set, and recompute all the average ages and per capita flows using this same age distribution for all populations. The results are shown in Figure 5, which looks very different than Figure 4. All arrows are now downwards. We see that most of the variation across countries has disappeared, but not all. Austria stands out for its short downward arrow, as does Uruguay. Among the regions, now Latin America has the shortest arrow, while the arrows for Europe/US and the lowest income region, South and Southeast Asia, are
nearly identical. This shows clearly that population age distribution has a huge effect on the direction of transfers. Nonetheless, it is not the whole story, and in addition the arrows summarize and thus obscure other important changes and differences.

These data are cross-sectional and not historical. Nonetheless, they suggest that over past millennia, the direction of income flows has been strongly downwards from older to younger, probably in all societies. Once we realize the key role that population aging has played in shortening the arrows and even reversing them, it follows that in the pretransitional and therefore young populations of the past, income would have been reallocated downwards across age for any plausible shape of the per capita age profiles. The young population age distributions of the times would have placed so much weight on the necessarily heavy dependence of the children that downward transfers would have dominated any upward flows that may have occurred.

Over almost all of human history, income has been reallocated from adults to the young to support the costs of the long period of maturation and dependency. Fairly recently, probably starting during the last half century, there has been a sea change with the direction of net flows shifting from downward to upward. This does not mean that we now invest less in our children; in fact we now invest more per individual child relative to our labor income, with heavy expenditures on education in particular (Lee and Mason 2010). But it does underline the heavy cost of supporting our growing proportions of increasingly costly elderly, a cost that is likely to grow greatly in the coming decades as populations age.

The Roles of Private and Public Transfers

We have seen the extent to which individuals are able to consume more than their labor income, particularly in childhood and old age. But how exactly is this accomplished? The many mechanisms can be classed under the headings of transfers or asset operations. Asset operations include saving and investing during the working ages and dissaving while living on asset income and asset sales in old age. They also include borrowing money to pay for higher education, or to buy a house or a car, paying interest on the loan, and eventually repaying the principle. All borrowing and lending, paying and receiving interest or dividends, and similar operations come under this heading, including operations involving foreigners and foreign governments. These asset operations are included in NTA, but will not be discussed here. Instead we will emphasize transfers. These include private or familial transfers, both intrahousehold and interhousehold, and public transfers, both in-kind and monetary. Remittances to or from other countries are private interhousehold transfers.

NTA includes explicit measures of both public and private transfers. Public transfers received are estimated using the in-kind transfers that have already been included in the measure of consumption, plus cash transfers to individuals such as public pensions, family allowances, public assistance and unemployment insurance, plus a prorated share of expenditures on public goods such as the military, publicly funded research, social infrastructure, and so on. Public transfers made are based on various kinds of taxes paid by age. Private transfers are interhousehold and intrahousehold. Interhousehold transfers
are reported on some surveys, and are here assumed to go to the head of the household who redistributes them through transfers to other members. Remittances from abroad are also interhousehold transfers. Intrahousehold transfers are measured as if a tax were levied within the household on all labor income in excess of consumption, and transfers are assumed to be made to those who consume more than they produce. Transfers in this way are allowed without passing through the head of household. The household assets, such as consumer durables or a home, are assumed to be owned by the head, and the services imputed to these assets are then transferred to household members in the usual way and counted as transfers from the head. It is important to note that our estimates do not include bequests at death.\textsuperscript{10}

Estimates of public and private transfers are not yet available for all the 23 countries of the previous figures. Figure 6 shows arrows for private \textit{inter vivos} transfers for those countries with the data, and empty spaces otherwise. The tails and heads are placed on the average age of making a private transfer and receiving a private transfer. The width of the arrow is now the per capita value of private transfers, divided by average labor income.

The figure shows that in every region, private transfers are strongly downwards. Nonetheless, there are some important differences in length and thickness of these arrows. East Asia has the shortest arrows. Although they make strong private transfers per child for health and education, fertility is low, and Taiwan and Korea make strong transfers to the elderly as well through the family support system for the elderly which offsets the effect of the child transfers. Latin America and Southeast Asia have the longest arrows reflecting their higher fertility and younger populations with fewer elderly, so that transfers to children dominate. Aside form Thailand, these countries do not have strong familial transfers to the elderly.

Europe and the US have strangely thin arrows. In part, this is because they have very low fertility and few children, so transfers to children are reduced.\textsuperscript{11} But in addition, these countries have very strong welfare states with good public education and, except for the US, good publicly provided health care for children. Private expenditures on children for health and education are very limited. At the same time, private transfers to the elderly are nonexistent, and in fact the elderly make net private inter vivos transfers to younger generations on average. All this tends to make the arrows longer and thinner.

Figure 7 shows similar arrows, but this time for the standard population age distribution. We note that Brazil has by far the strongest downward private transfers of any country, as measured by the size of the transfer wealth (area of the arrow). There are some other differences from the own population arrows, but no qualitative differences, so we will not dwell on these.

The finding that private transfers are uniformly downwards from older to younger ages is important. In Caldwell’s (1976) classic article on the demographic transition, he wrote: “The key issue here, and, I will argue, the fundamental issue in demographic transition, is the \textit{direction and magnitude of intergenerational wealth flows} or the net balance of the
two flows—one from parents to children and the other from children to parents—over the
period from when people become parents until they die.... In all primitive societies and
nearly all traditional societies the net flow is from child to parent.” (p.140). If we take
this statement at face value, then Figures 6 and 7 contradict it for rich and poor countries
alike. Private transfers, the ones relevant for private fertility decisions, are uniformly
downward from older to younger on average. The figures confirm earlier similar findings
by Lee, 1994b and 2000 and Stecklov 1999. When we interpret the statement more
broadly to include other instrumental benefits that adults may derive from their children,
such as insurance and physical security, then it is more difficult to bring quantitative
evidence to bear (see Caldwell 2005 for an updated statement of his views, emphasizing
that child services such as insurance should be taken into account).

In pretransitional agricultural societies, private transfers dwarf public transfers in
importance, but the situation changes as countries become richer and more industrial and
urban. Figure 8 exhibits the arrows for public transfers. Towards the bottom of the chart,
the arrows are long and point left or downwards to younger ages, and are short and
mostly point to the right at the top in the richer countries. Evidently, at least in an
accounting sense, the public sector plays a bigger role in the reversal of the direction of
transfer flows than does the private. The countries and regions show very divergent
patterns. Net public transfers for Europe are upwards, with the strong public pension
programs and health care for the elderly dominating public education and family
allowances, and with the already old populations of Europe. The US, however, is an
exception to this pattern with a downward arrow, the only one in the region, due in part to
its younger age structure. The East Asian regional arrows generally point to the young
(left), but Japan with its old population and important public transfers to the elderly looks
much like the European countries. Aside from Japan, these countries do not have strong
public pension programs and spending on health care is less than in Europe and the US.
Taiwan and S. Korea have relatively large familial transfers to the elderly. The upward
arrow for Latin America is striking and surprising, because these populations are still
young, except for Uruguay. However, the Latin American countries in our sample mostly
have strong welfare state programs including very strong public pension programs. South
East Asia has by far the strongest downward public flow, reflecting their higher fertility
and lack of public pension programs.

Age standardization (see Figure 9) has the interesting effect of strengthening the upward
direction of public transfers in Latin America and reversing it in the US and the
Europe/US region, since the former becomes older and the latter younger thereby. The
positive public transfer wealth in Latin America is expected to displace some of the
capital that would otherwise have been saved by workers to provide for retirement in old
age. Given the actual age distributions of the US and Europe, the same is true there.
Indeed, this is one of the concerns about the public pensions of the rich countries.

One important question is whether there is substitution between public and private
transfers. Do public transfers crowd out private? For example, it is hard to believe that
private spending on education and health care would not be greater if there were no
public programs providing them. We also expect that without public pensions, elders
would more frequently coreside with their adult children and receive support from them. But it is also possible that the alternative to public pensions would be private ones, or continuing labor effort by the elderly.

While these arguments may seem plausible, it is also true that national cultures may differ considerably in the importance of spending on children and support for the elderly. Thus the relative level of consumption by the elderly varies substantially from country to country, and the same is true for human capital investments in children (health and education, see Lee and Mason 2010).

A simple scatter plot of private transfer wealth versus public transfer wealth, using a standard population age distribution, reveals a negative relationship but not a strong or striking one (see Figure 10). The regression coefficient is -.4, indicating that each unit increase of public transfer wealth is associated with .4 units less of negative private transfer wealth, consistent with a crowding out or substitution story. Three of the countries are special cases. China, which is far above the regression line, has unusually low consumption relative to labor income due to her exceptionally high saving rate. This leads to both private and public transfer wealth falling closer to zero. Mexico, and to a lesser degree the Philippines, have high remittance income and so they have more negative private transfer wealth than would be expected given their labor income. Without these special countries in the regression the slope rises to nearly -.5 and $R^2$ improves to nearly .3, but this sort of selective exclusion exercise is dangerous.

We note that Brazil has by far the greatest positive public transfer wealth and by far the most negative private transfer wealth, and perhaps this is not a coincidence.

A Closer Look at the Composition of Public Transfers

The final two figures, 11 and 12, present arrow diagrams for different components of public transfers: education, health, pensions, other in-cash, and other in-kind. The first three are self explanatory. Other in-cash includes such items as family allowances and need-based cash transfers. Other in-kind could include some need-based transfers such as food, but the bulk of it is public good type expenditures that cannot be allocated to any particular individual or age group, such as military spending, social infrastructure, research, and so on. We treat these as going equally to each individual, but the transfer is made by tax payers who differ from the average age. The main interest is in education, health care, and pensions. We note that for purposes of these figures, we have placed all the tails of the arrows on the average age of paying all taxes in each country, although in many cases there are special taxes for some programs such as pensions or education. Thus for a given country, the tails of all arrows are located at the same age.

In Figure 11, it is striking that pensions are so stingy in the US, the richest country in the figure, and are so generous in Brazil, the second poorest country in the figure. To remove any effect of the different age structures Figure 12 uses the standard for all countries. Here there is little change for the US, but Brazil’s pension program now dominates all others in the figure. Both countries are anomalous in this regard. Most poor countries
have small pension programs and most rich countries have generous ones, with or without age distribution standardized.

The two figures also reveal that only countries in the Europe/US region, plus Japan, have substantial public health care expenditures. Even relatively rich Taiwan and S. Korea have weak public expenditures on health. Brazil and Costa Rica stand out among the poorer countries.

For education, Figure 12 shows Sweden with greater expenditures and a younger mean age of receiving education, perhaps reflecting strong public childcare expenditures. Taiwan and S. Korea both have relatively weak spending on education, but these countries substantially augment public spending with complementary private expenditures for tutoring, cram schools, and other complements to public education (see Lee and Mason 2010).

The average age of paying taxes is particularly high in the US in Figure 12, and similarly high in the Philippines. This reflects the high labor income earned in old age in these countries.

Conclusions and Discussion
In every population we have studied, net familial transfers are strongly downward from older to younger, which is consistent with evolutionary theory, and inconsistent with simple versions of wealth flow theory. Even the Asian countries with strong familial old age support, such as Taiwan, S. Korea, China and Thailand, have downward familial transfers overall. Parental net transfers to children over the life cycle are also the net cost of children, and they enter into fertility decisions in complicated ways (Becker and Lewis 1973; Willis 1988; Willis 1994). In societies in which the elderly are supported by public unfunded pension and health systems, costs of this support drive a wedge between the public and private cost or benefit of children, and might contribute to the low fertility of today’s industrial nations – might, but we offer no evidence on this point here (Lee 1990).

There has been a fundamental change in the direction of net intergenerational transfers from downward to upward, with most of the change driven by population aging in the later part of the most advanced demographic transitions. Changes in the shape of the economic life cycle also contributed: old age consumption rose relative to consumption at other adult ages. At the same time, expenditures per child were raised by increasing per child human capital investment in a smaller number of children per couple. It seems likely that the growing role of the welfare state played an important role in promoting these changes. In particular, heavy public transfers to the elderly have become common, even in some low income Latin American countries, and these have apparently largely replaced familial support for the elderly. We say “apparently” because we do not have strong evidence here of the substitution of public for private transfers. The case of Brazil, with the most generous public transfers to the elderly and the most strongly downward private transfers, is certainly suggestive. However, we do not see net familial support of the elderly in the poorest countries in our collection where there are no appreciable public
transfers for the elderly. Income earned by assets of the elderly, such as land and livestock, probably plays an important role in these situations. In rich industrial countries, the demand for leisure at the end of life has risen with income. In the lower income countries, individuals are more likely to continue to work, and this prolonged work also diminishes the need for family transfers to the elderly.

It is clear that current public transfers to the elderly in rich industrial countries will not be sustainable as populations age over the next few decades. Patterns of work, consumption, and intergenerational transfers through both public and private sectors will surely change. Already there are important moves to restructure public pension programs and to contain costs in public health care programs. In some rich countries, labor supply of the elderly has begun to rise, at least slightly. However, it seems unlikely that these changes will prevent more reversals in the direction of flows as rich industrial nations age rapidly. Some less developed Latin American countries have adopted the public transfer programs of Europe, and will experience the resulting fiscal pressures, and perhaps similar reversals of flows. Asian countries other than Japan have so far gone a different route, with strong private, but weak public, support of the elderly. Once sustainability problems are resolved, the direction of flows is not in itself an issue. Nonetheless, rising public expenditures on the elderly may compete with public investment in children, and for countries with declining numbers of workers to support increasing numbers of elderly, underinvestment in children would be a very bad outcome. More generally, policy makers should consider levels and trends in the intergenerational and inter-age distribution of consumption, rather than leaving these to be shaped as an incidental byproduct of institutions and policies designed long ago for other purposes.
References


Figure 1. The Economic Life Cycle of Hunter-Gatherers (HG), Poor Agricultural Populations, and Rich Industrial Populations: Consumption and Labor Income (Ratio to average labor income, ages 30-49)

Note: See text for methods of construction and data sources.
Figure 2. The Life Cycle Deficit (Consumption minus Labor Income) of Hunter-Gatherers, Poor Agricultural Populations, and Rich Industrial Populations

Note: See text for method of construction and data sources.
Note: Data from Maliki (forthcoming). The per capita age profiles in Panel A are multiplied by the proportional population age distribution in Panel C to get the population-weighted age profiles shown in Panel C. The average ages of these two profiles are calculated by multiplying them at each age by that age, summing, and dividing by the sum of the original profile across age. The height of the arrow is the per capita consumption divided by average labor income at ages 30-49, which is .61. The area of the arrow is the product of its length, 6.8 years, times the height of the arrow, .61, or -4.2 years. The area is negative because the arrow points to the left, that is $A_c - A_{y_1} < 0$. The interpretation is that in order to achieve the per capita consumption by age shown in the first panel, given labor income by age, the average member of the population must hold debt equal to 4.2 years of average annual labor income (for workers age 30-49).
Average Age of C and YL, with Regions

Own-Country Population

Arrow point: avg age of C; arrow tail: age age of YL; width: per capita C rel to avg YL(30-49).
Area is implied wealth. Within region, country order by ppp-adj avg GDP.

Date Created: Tue Jul 20 21:22:06 2010
Average Age of C and YL, with Regions
Standard Population

Arrow point: avg age of C; arrow tail: age age of YL; width: per capita C rel to avg YL(30-49).
Area is implied wealth. Within region, country order by ppp-adj avg GDP.

Date Created: Tue Jul 20 21:22:25 2010
Average Age of TFI and TFO, with Regions
Own-Country Population

Arrow point: avg age of TFI; arrow tail: age age of TFO; width: per capita TFI rel to avg YL(30-49).
Area is implied wealth. Within region, country order by ppp-adj avg GDP.

Date Created: Tue Jul 20 21:22:42 2010
Average Age of TFI and TFO, with Regions
Standard Population

Arrow point: avg age of TFI; arrow tail: age age of TFO; width: avg of per capita TFI and abs(TFO) relative to area.
Area is implied wealth. Within region, country order by ppp-adj avg GDP.

Date Created: Tue Jul 20 21:23:23 2010
Average Age of TGI and TGO, with Regions
Own-Country Population

Arrow point: avg age of TGI; arrow tail: age of TGO; width: per capita TGI rel to avg YL(30-49).
Area is implied wealth. Within region, country order by ppp-adj avg GDP.
Date Created: Tue Jul 20 21:32:54 2010
Fig 9

Average Age of TGI and TGO, with Regions

Standard Population

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Arrow point: avg age of TGI; arrow tail: age of TGO; width: avg of per capita TGI and abs(TGO) rel
Area is implied wealth. Within region, country order by ppp-adj avg GDP.
Date Created: Tue Jul 20 21:24:00 2010
Figure 10. Forms of Transfer Wealth in Standard Pops: Tf vs Tg

\[ y = -0.4047x - 4.0388 \]
\[ R^2 = 0.148 \]
Average Age of TG Sector Flows
Own-Country Population

Arrow point is avg age of inflow; inside of tail is avg age of outflow. Outflow age profile same for all sectors, adjusted to match agg inflow. Width is per capita inflow rel to avg YL(30-49). Area is implied wealth. Within region, ordered by ppp-adj avg GDP.

Date Created: Tue Jul 20 21:21:03 2010
Average Age of Public Sector Flows
Standard Population

Europe & US
United States
Sweden
Austria
Finland
Slovenia
Spain
Hungary
East Asia
Japan
Taiwan
Korea
Latin America
Chile
Uruguay
Costa Rica
Mexico
Brazil
Southeast Asia
Thailand
Philippines

Arrow point is avg age of inflow; inside of tail is avg age of outflow. Outflow age profile same for all sectors, adjusted to match agg inflow. Width is average of per capita inflow and outflow avg YL(30-49). Area is implied wealth. Within region, ordered by ppp-adj avg GDP.

Date Created: Tue Jul 20 21:21:21 2010
Endnotes

1 Note that these caloric needs weights are somewhat different than the equivalent adult consumer weights used by NTA, which will lead to some differences in estimated age profiles. In particular, a decline in estimated consumption at older ages in hunter-gatherer populations is largely explained in this way.
2 However, it is possible that the level of fertility is associated with level of female labor supply, and therefore with the shape of the labor income curve, so this age range is not without its own problem.
3 We value in-kind public transfers at the cost of providing them. However, the elderly, for example, may value the in-kind health care they receive at less than its cost of provision. Put differently, public provision of in-kind transfers may involve greater inefficiencies than private provision by the family. National Transfer Accounts cannot assess the utility or welfare contributions arising from transfers, but they do measure the expenditures involved.
4 Of the 23 contemporary populations studied here, only China is funding its lifecycle deficit entirely out of labor income. Mexico and the Philippines are two examples of countries relying heavily on net foreign transfers (remittances) to fund their lifecycle deficit.
5 Let $c(x)$ be the per capita consumption at age $x$, and let $N(x)$ be the total population at age $x$. Then aggregate consumption at age $x$ is $c(x)N(x)$. The average age of consumption, $A_c$, is given by

$$A_c = \frac{\sum_{x=0}^{\alpha} xN(x)c(x)}{\sum_{x=0}^{\alpha} N(x)c(x)}.$$ 

The average age of labor income is calculated similarly. Per capita consumption over all ages is given by

$$c = \frac{C}{N} = \frac{\sum_{x=0}^{\alpha} N(x)c(x)}{\sum_{x=0}^{\alpha} N(x)}.$$ 

6 Calculations we have done elsewhere have shown that the approximation is quite good under the assumption that the discount rate is 3% per year and that individuals expect the age profiles of labor income and consumption to be rising at 1% per year. We did not try other assumptions.
7 The arrow for the !Kung is located farther right than the arrow for the Ache, Piro and Machiguenga. This is because fertility is considerably lower (for the !Kung and consequently the !Kung population is older.
8 For the per capita flows, we adjusted the level but not shape of the consumption age profile until the ratio of aggregate consumption to aggregate labor income in this hypothetical simulated economy is the same as it was in the actual economy. The length and direction of the arrows are unaffected by this adjustment; only the width of the arrow and its area are affected.
9 Pre-transitional populations had young populations that were proximately due to their high fertility. That their fertility was quite high follows from their generally high mortality and non-negative growth rates.
10 We have estimates of bequests for a few countries, based on the assumption (known to be false) that mortality is independent of asset holdings. We plan to estimate bequests more systematically in the future. Note that only the results plotted in Figures 6, 7, and 10, all involving private transfers, would be affected by inclusion of bequests.
11 At lower levels of fertility there is higher investment per child in education and health care. However, total consumption expenditures for children are distinctly lower in populations with lower fertility, because general other consumption is not as responsive to lower fertility.
12 China’s very high saving rate will eventually lead to large bequests, either public or private, strengthening downward transfers. We expect this will occur in a number of other countries, particularly those with high public pensions which are either not full spent, or which make possible the preservation of the assets of the elderly. Unfortunately, bequests are not yet included in the National Transfer Accounts.