Consumption Inequality and Intra-Household Allocations*

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Abstract

The consumption literature uses adult equivalence scales to measure individual level inequality. This practice imposes the assumption that there is no within household inequality. In this paper, we show that ignoring consumption inequality within households produces misleading estimates of inequality along two dimensions. First, the use of adult equivalence scales underestimates the level of cross sectional consumption inequality by 30%. This result is driven by the fact that large differences in the earnings of husbands and wives translate into large differences in consumption allocations within households. Second, the rise in inequality since the 1970s is overstated by two-thirds: within household inequality declined over time as the share of income provided by wives increased. Our findings also indicate that increases in marital sorting on wages and hours worked can simultaneously explain virtually all of the decline in within household inequality and a substantial fraction of the rise in between household inequality for one and two adult households in the UK since the 1970s.

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1 Introduction

A recent literature has documented a large rise in consumption inequality in several developed countries. Underlying these measures of inequality is the use of adult equivalence scales, which are used to assign consumption levels to each member of a household. This has been necessary as there do not exist comprehensive measures of individual level consumption for households with more than one member. However, the drawback of this approach is that it implicitly assumes that there is no inequality among adults within the household. In particular, the use of adult equivalence scales implies a very restrictive model of the household in which husbands and wives split consumption equally, regardless of the source of the income.

This equal division assumption is inappropriate in the study of consumption inequality, as a large literature routinely rejects the assumption that the consumption allocation does not vary with the source of income in the household (Blundell et al., 2002; Browning, Bourguignon, et al., 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori 1988, 1992; Chiappori et al., 2002; Donni, 2001; Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997; Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981, among many others). Since there has been a sizable increase in women’s wages and labor supply over the last half century, the share of household earnings provided by the wife has changed substantially over time. If consumption allocations depend on the source of income and the sources of income within households have changed over time, then adult equivalence scales will produce an inaccurate picture of the trends in consumption inequality.

The goal of this paper is to document the trends in consumption inequality once within household inequality is taken into account. We construct and estimate a static

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2 Recently, there has been a substantial departure from this literature. Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2004) relax the assumption that household members split consumption equally in the construction of adult equivalence scales. Hong and Ríos-Rull (2004) use information on the purchase of life insurance to estimate equivalence scales.
model of intra-household allocations to examine how changes in the source of income in the household translate into changes in individual-level consumption allocations. In particular, we observe variation in labor supply, total household consumption, and wages for singles and married couples in the data. We use the joint relationships between consumption, wages and labor supply for single households and between own and spousal wages in married households to infer the private consumption levels for married men and women. The model is estimated on a sample of one and two person households from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for the years 1968 to 2001. Under relatively weak identification assumptions, the model allows us to infer the level of consumption allocated to each member of the household, which is necessary for the measurement of individual level consumption inequality.

We then use our estimates to construct a new measure of consumption inequality across individuals. We have two main findings. First, measures of consumption inequality that ignore the potential for intra-household inequality may underestimate individual-level inequality by 30%, as the difference in earnings across husbands and wives generates substantial within household inequality. Second, the rise in consumption inequality reported in the literature is overstated by two-thirds. This result is due to the fact that within household inequality has fallen over time as female wages and labor supply have increased. An implication of our findings is that the equal sharing assumption implicit in adult equivalence scales is valid only for households in which the wife has the same earnings as her husband.

In this paper, we provide an alternative picture of the trends in inequality. Our analysis also sheds new light on the forces underlying the trends. We provide evidence on the importance of several potential explanations for the rise in consumption inequality between households and the fall in inequality within households since the 1970s in the UK. While changes in the demographic composition of the population appear to play a limited role, an increase in marital sorting has profound effects on the trends in consumption inequality.\footnote{In this instance, the degree of marital sorting is measured by the correlation between character-}
served in the data has the potential to account for all of the fall in within household inequality and at the same time can explain a large fraction of the rise in consumption inequality between households. Clearly, looking inside the household is as important as looking between households for the study of consumption inequality.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the stylized facts on earnings and consumption inequality, wages, and labor supply that provide the motivation for our study. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and the identification strategy for estimating the rule to allocate consumption to individuals within a household. Section 4 describes the data set and the strategy for estimating the model. The estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents a decomposition of consumption inequality and considers the importance of several explanations for the trends in consumption inequality. Section 7 concludes.

2 Trends in Consumption and Earnings Inequality in the UK

In this section, we outline the main stylized facts regarding consumption and income inequality in the UK between 1968 and 2001. The data we use to conduct our analysis comes from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES). The FES contains information on household consumption expenditures and earnings over the period 1968 to the present. In the construction of the following stylized facts, we restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 16 and 65 and eliminate students, retirees and the self-employed. We are particularly interested in the following four features of the data:

1. There has been a large rise in earnings inequality between individuals. Figure 1 documents the trend in the Gini index for the distribution of individual and household earnings. The Gini index for individual earnings has risen by 12% over the past 30 years. This rise in earnings inequality in the UK has been well documented in the literature (e.g. Blundell and Preston, 1998).
2. Although earnings inequality between individuals is much higher than earnings inequality between households, the latter rose much more rapidly: the Gini index for inequality between households rose by 41% between 1968 and 2001.

3. As reported by Blundell and Preston (1998), there has been a corresponding rise in consumption inequality. To account for economies of scale, we construct a standard measure of individual-level consumption by dividing total household consumption by the square root of household size. The Gini index for this measure of consumption is presented Figure 1. The level of income inequality is higher than the level of consumption inequality but the rise in inequality is higher for consumption than for earnings.

4. As illustrated in Figure 2, the correlation between the earnings of husbands and wives increased dramatically over time. This is due to both the fall in the gender wage gap and the rise in female labor supply. Figure 3 highlights the dramatic change in the gender wage gap and in women’s contribution to household labor income between 1968 and the present. The dashed line represents the female’s share of potential income, defined as the share of labor earnings that would be contributed by the wife if both spouses worked full-time. The solid line represents women’s share of actual household earnings. Overall, potential earnings of wives increased by 13.5%, and women’s share of earnings in the household increased by 93% over the sample period. The latter partly reflects the increase in women’s wages relative to those of men, but also the large changes in female and male employment rates and hours worked since the 1960s.

In summary, the evidence presented here highlights the fact that there has been a large rise in earnings and consumption inequality between households while at the same time there has been a fall in inequality in the earnings distribution within households.

Footnote 4: For households with missing wage data due to non-participation, we include a predicted wage based on a standard selection-corrected wage equation. Results are available upon request.
3 Theoretical Framework

In this section, we present a model that allows us to infer the level of consumption for each member of a household. The model is based on Chiappori’s (1988, 1992) collective model of household decision making. This framework is less restrictive than the model of equal division underlying adult equivalence scales, as the only restriction on the intra-household allocation process is that households reach Pareto efficient allocations. We start with a description of the problem faced by single agents. We then describe the intra-household allocation decision of married couples. Finally, we outline the model restrictions that allow for the identification of the share of consumption allocated to each household member.

3.1 Single Agents

Assume all single individuals have preferences over leisure and consumption. Denote leisure, expenditures on private consumption and expenditures on public consumption for an agent of gender $g, g \in \{m, f\}$ by $L^g, C^g,$ and $P$, respectively. Labor supply is denoted $l^g$ and the total time available to agents is normalized to one, i.e. $l^g = 1 - L^g$. Denote total household non-labor income net of savings by $Y$. Labor earnings are denoted $w^g(l)$ and include any after tax income that depends directly on the labor supply decision. In particular, $w^g(l)$ includes unemployment insurance benefits paid to individuals who are not working. Preferences for single agents are described by $U^g(u^g(L^g, C^g), P)$, where it is assumed preferences over private consumption goods and leisure are separable from preferences over public consumption goods. Single agents choose labor supply and consumption to maximize utility, subject to the budget constraint:

$$\max_{L^g, C^g, P} U^g(u^g(L^g, C^g), P)$$

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5See also Browning et al. (1994), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori et al. (2002) and Blundell et al. (2002)

6Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2002) establish conditions under which the collective model with public goods is identified.

7We construct labor earnings in this fashion, as unemployment benefits are paid directly to one person in the household and likely affect allocations differently than does shared non-labor income.
subject to $C^g + P = w^g(l) + Y$.

### 3.2 Married Couples

Consider a two member household, where each member has distinct preferences over own leisure, own private consumption, and household public consumption. Denote by $C$ a Hicksian composite good that contains private and public consumption:

$$C = C^f + C^m + P.$$  

As with singles, we assume that private consumption and leisure ($C^g, L^g$) are separable from consumption of the public good ($P$) for married couples. Preferences for a married person of gender $g$ can be described by:

$$V^g(v^g(L^g, C^g), P),$$

where $v^g(L^g, C^g)$ captures preferences over private consumption and leisure. Under the assumptions that preferences are egoistic and that allocations are Pareto efficient, the household’s allocations are the solution to the problem:

$$\max_{L^f, L^m, C^f, C^m, P} \lambda V^f(v^f(L^f, C^f), P) + (1 - \lambda)V^m(v^m(L^m, C^m), P)$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

subject to $C^f + C^m + P = w^f(l) + w^m(l) + Y$.

The Pareto weight, $\lambda$, represents the female’s bargaining power within the household, and will typically be a function of full-time labor income ($w^f(1), w^m(1)$), non-labor income ($Y$) and other “distribution factors” ($z$) that influence household bargaining power, but do not have an effect on individual preferences, as in Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002).

Chiappori (1992) shows that the intra-household allocation problem faced by a husband and wife can be decentralized by considering a two stage process. In the first stage the husband and wife decide on the level of public good consumption ($P$) and on how to divide the remaining non labor income $y = Y - P$. The assumption that consumption of the public good is separable from leisure and private consumption is
key to allowing the allocation of public consumption to occur in the first stage (see Chiappori, Blundell, and Meghir (2002) for details).\textsuperscript{8} Define the sharing rule $\phi(y, z)$ as the amount of non-labor income that is assigned to the wife. Then $y - \phi(y, z)$ is non-labor income assigned to the husband.

In the second step, each household member chooses his or her own private consumption and leisure, conditional on the level of public consumption and the budget constraint determined in the first stage:

$$\max_{L^g, C^g} v^g(L^g, C^g)$$

subject to $C^g = w^g(l) + \phi^g(y, z)$,

where $\phi^f = \phi(y, z)$ and $\phi^m = y - \phi(y, z)$. The Pareto problem represented in (1) and the sharing rule interpretation in (2) produce identical labor supplies and consumption demands, under the assumption that an efficient level of public consumption is chosen in the first stage.

### 3.3 Identification of the Sharing Rule in the Case of Quadratic Preferences

The question we aim to address in this paper is whether measures of consumption inequality from the collective model differ from measures in the literature based on standard equivalence scales. To provide an answer to this question, it is necessary to obtain an estimate of the full sharing rule to uncover the share of income allocated to each household member for consumption. In this case, the first order conditions of the sharing rule are not sufficient for identification. We therefore need to impose an additional restriction on preferences. As in Vermeulen (2003) and Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2004), we assume that married individuals have the same marginal utility from private consumption as single individuals, but possibly different marginal utility for leisure and public consumption. In Section 5, we test whether this assumption is supported by the data.

\textsuperscript{8}We do not incorporate savings in the model. However, under the assumptions that preferences are time separable and the level of savings is efficient, we can obtain estimates of the sharing rule while abstracting from the savings decision of the household.
Our treatment of households extends the models of Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir (2002) and Vermeulen (2003) to allow for households in which both spouses do not necessarily work full time and in which both spouses make labor force participation decisions.\textsuperscript{9} In particular, we assume that individuals can choose from $H$ discrete labor supply possibilities, in addition to non-participation.\textsuperscript{10} Further assume that $L^f, L^m, Y, w^f(l), \text{ and } w^m(l)$ are observed in the data. As is consistent with our empirical exercise, $C$ and $P$ are observed although the distribution of private consumption between the husband and wife ($C^f$ and $C^m$) is not observed.

Let preferences for private consumption and leisure be represented by a quadratic direct utility function, a flexible form representing a second-order Taylor series expansion in leisure and consumption. The utility a single individual of gender $g$ derives from labor supply choice $h$ is:

$$U^g_h = v^g(l_h, C^g_h) + \omega^g(P) + \epsilon^g_h$$

$$= \alpha^g_l l^2_h + \alpha^g_l l_h C^g_h + \alpha^g_c C^g_h + \alpha^g_{cc}(C^g_h)^2 + \alpha^g_p P^g_h + \alpha^g_{pp}(P^g_h)^2 + \epsilon^g_h,$$

and the utility a married individual of gender $g$ derives from labor supply choice $h$ is:

$$V^g_h = \beta^g_l l^2_h + \beta^g_l l_h C^g_h + \alpha^g_c C^g_h + \alpha^g_{cc}(C^g_h)^2 + \beta^g_p P^g_h + \beta^g_{pp}(P^g_h)^2 + \epsilon^g_h,$$

where $\epsilon^g_h$ is an unobserved preference component that is assumed to be distributed iid across individuals and labor supply choices.\textsuperscript{11} This specification allows the marginal utility of leisure and public consumption to differ between married and single men and women, but restricts the marginal utility of private consumption to be the same for both married couples and singles.

\textsuperscript{9}Blundell et al. (2002) model the labor force decision of the wife as continuous and of the husband as discrete; either he works full time or not at all. Vermeulen (2003) considers the case where males are assumed to work full-time and females face a discrete labor supply choice which includes the option of non-participation.

\textsuperscript{10}This assumption is not necessary for identification, and is not very restrictive, as the discrete choice of hours can be any integer value of weekly hours.

\textsuperscript{11}We relax this assumption in Section 5.2.
Assume the sharing rule is linear in the distribution factors:

$$\phi(y, z) = \left(\phi_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \phi_k z_k\right) y = (z^T \phi) y,$$

where there are $K$ distribution factors plus a constant in the vector $z$ and where $y$ is non-labor income net of expenditures on the public good. We can condition on household expenditures on the public good for both singles and married couples under the assumptions that households make efficient decisions in the first stage and that preferences over public goods are separable from preferences over consumption and leisure (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980).

The budget constraints for the second stage of the budgeting process can be expressed as:

$$C_h^g = w^g(l_h) + y$$ (3)

for single individuals,

$$C_h^f = w^f(l_h) + (z^T \phi) y$$ (4)

for married women and

$$C_h^m = w^m(l_h) + (1 - z^T \phi) y$$ (5)

for married men.

Only differences in utility between labor supply choices matter in the model; thus the parameters must be estimated relative to a base case. We assume that the choice of not working ($h = 0$) is the base case. After substituting the budget constraint into the utility function, the difference between working $h > 0$, $\forall h \in \{1, 2, ..., H\}$ and not working ($h = 0$) for single men and women can be expressed as:

$$U_h^g - U_0^g = \alpha_i^g l_h + \alpha_{ik}^g l_h^2 + \alpha_{il}^g l_h \cdot \tilde{w}^g(l_h) + \alpha_{il}^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h) + \alpha_{cc}^g \left[ (\tilde{w}^g(l_h))^2 + 2\tilde{w}^g(l_h) \cdot y \right] + \varepsilon_h^g - \varepsilon_0^g,$$ (6)

where $\tilde{w}^g(l_h) = w^g(l_h) - w^g(l_0)$ and $[\tilde{w}^g(l_h)]^2 = [w^g(l_h)]^2 - [w^g(l_0)]^2$. Consider next the problem of a married woman. The difference between working $h > 0$, $\forall h \in$
\{1, 2, ..., H\} and not working (\(h = 0\)) is described by:

\[
V_h^f - V_0^f = \beta_h^f l_h + \beta_h^l \tilde{w}^f(l_h) + \alpha_h^f l_h \cdot \tilde{w}^f(l_h) + \alpha_h^l (z^\top \phi) \cdot l_h \cdot y + \alpha_c^f \tilde{w}^f(l_h) + \alpha_c^l [\tilde{w}^f(l_h)]^2 + 2 \alpha_c^l (z^\top \phi) \cdot \tilde{w}^f(l_h) \cdot y + \varepsilon_h^f - \varepsilon_0^f.
\]

Finally, consider the problem of a married man, where the difference between working and not working (\(h > 0\), \(\forall h \in \{1, 2, ..., H\}\)) and not working (\(h = 0\)) is described by:

\[
V_h^m - V_0^m = \beta_h^m l_h + \beta_h^m \tilde{w}^m(l_h) + \alpha_h^m l_h \cdot \tilde{w}^m(l_h) + \alpha_h^m (z^\top \phi) \cdot l_h \cdot y + \alpha_c^m \tilde{w}^m(l_h) + \alpha_c^m [\tilde{w}^m(l_h)]^2 + 2 \alpha_c^m (z^\top \phi) \cdot \tilde{w}^m(l_h) \cdot y + \varepsilon_h^m - \varepsilon_0^m.
\]

The parameters \(\beta_g^f, \beta_g^l\) are directly identified from the data on married individuals. Given \(\alpha_g^l, \alpha_g^c\), and \(\alpha_g^p\), identified from data on single individuals, it is straightforward to recover the sharing rule parameters (\(\phi\)).\(^{12}\) It is the sharing rule parameters that allow us to determine the level of consumption enjoyed by each member of the household.

The differences in utility described by Equations (6), (7) and (8) can be expressed for single individuals in reduced form as:

\[
U_h^g - U_0^g = \Pi_h^g l_h + \Pi_h^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h) + \Pi_h^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h)y + \Pi_{\text{lm}}^g l_h \tilde{w}^g(l_h) + \Pi_{\text{wl}}^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h) + \Pi_{\text{wly}}^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h) \cdot y + \varepsilon_h^g - \varepsilon_0^g,
\]

and for married individuals as:

\[
V_h^g - V_0^g = \Pi_h^g l_h + \Pi_h^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h) + \Pi_h^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h)y + \Pi_{\text{lm}}^g l_h \tilde{w}^g(l_h) + \Pi_{\text{wl}}^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h) + \Pi_{\text{wly}}^g \tilde{w}^g(l_h) \cdot y + \varepsilon_h^g - \varepsilon_0^g,
\]

where the \(\Pi\)s are reduced form parameters. The system above implies a set of overidentifying restrictions for the sharing rule parameters that enable us to jointly test the

\(^{12}\)The parameters capturing preferences over the public consumption good (\(\alpha_g^p, \beta_g^p, \beta_g^p\)) can not be identified as the utility from consumption of the public good is the same regardless of the labor supply decision. One implication is that we will be able to estimate the sharing rule but not fully recover preferences. As a result, we cannot make welfare comparisons.
assumptions of the collective model, the functional form for preferences, the sharing rule, and the assumption that the marginal utility of private consumption is the same regardless of marital status:

\[ \phi_0 = \frac{\Pi_{ly}^f}{\Pi_{ly}^m} + 1 = \frac{\Pi_{wly}^f}{\Pi_{wly}^m} + 1 = -\frac{\Pi_{ly}^m}{\Pi_{ly}^m} = -\frac{\Pi_{wly}^m}{\Pi_{wly}^m}, \]

\[ \phi_k = \frac{\Pi_{zly}^f}{\Pi_{ly}^m} = \frac{\Pi_{zly}^m}{\Pi_{ly}^m} = -\frac{\Pi_{zly}^m}{\Pi_{ly}^m}, \quad k = 1 \ldots K. \tag{9} \]

In the following section, we outline our strategy for estimating the model and testing the above restrictions using consumption data from the UK.

4 Empirical Specification

4.1 Data

The data we use comes from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES). This data is ideal for the study of consumption inequality for three reasons. First, it contains detailed information on private and public consumption expenditures for households, on wages and labor supply for individuals, and on demographics including age, sex, education (from 1978 onward) and region of residence. Second, the FES has fewer problems with measurement issues than the leading contenders in the US and elsewhere.\(^{13}\) The FES uses a weekly diary to collect data on frequently purchased items and uses recall questions to collect data on large and infrequent expenditures. Finally, the FES contains information over the period 1968 to the present, which allows the study of changes in consumption inequality over a long period of time.

Our sample contains single person households and couples without children.\(^{14}\) We restrict the age range in the sample to individuals between the ages of 22 and 65 and eliminate students and the self-employed. Households in which one of the individuals

\(^{13}\)Battistin (2003) documents reporting errors in the US Consumer Expenditure Survey due to survey design.

\(^{14}\)We exclude households with children in this paper to abstract from the intra-household allocation of resources for children’s consumption. This is obviously an important issue. To this end, our estimates of the sharing rule and the comparison of various inequality measures only apply to households without children. We leave to future work an analysis of consumption inequality for the entire sample of households.
is in the top one per cent of the wage distribution are also excluded. The resulting sample contains 87,668 individuals.\footnote{The sample size in 1968 is 2,584 and the sample size in 2001 is 2,757. The sample sizes do not vary markedly across years: the smallest sample is 2,502 in 1979 and the largest is 2,932 in 2000.} Descriptive statistics for our entire sample are presented in Table 1.

We define consumption and non-labor income measures as follows. Total consumption is defined as total household expenditures. Public consumption is defined as expenditures on housing, light and power, and household durable goods. Private household consumption is total expenditures net of public consumption. Other income is defined as total household expenditures minus net labor income. We use this expenditure based definition of non-labor income, as it is consistent with the assumptions of a two stage budgeting process, time separable preferences, and separability of public goods consumption from leisure and private consumption as in the model.\footnote{In estimation, household expenditures on public goods are subtracted from other income, resulting in non-labor income net of public goods consumption. In addition to the separability assumptions, wage profiles are assumed to be exogenous. This rules out the possibility of job-specific human capital accumulation.}

To construct the level of consumption corresponding to each labor supply decision, including zero hours, we need to assign an earnings level to all individuals. For those who are working we use the usual hourly wage, defined as weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. For non-participants we use a predicted wage, computed based on a reduced form selection-corrected wage equation.\footnote{The log of the wage is estimated as a function of age, birth cohort, year, quarter, and regional dummies, plus the age at which full time education was completed, and its square. The selection equation is identified by the exclusion from the wage equation of household non-labor income, marital status, and the age, education, and the labor income of the spouse. Results are available upon request.} After tax earnings are subsequently computed by converting weekly wage income to an annual base, deducting the appropriate personal allowance and then applying the appropriate tax rate. Personal allowances and marginal tax rates are from the Board of Inland Revenue (1968–2001). All monetary values are expressed in 1987 pounds. The resulting income measure is treated as known and is used to construct the within household distribution factor defined as the potential share of household labor income contributed by the wife, $z_1 = w^f / (w^f + w^m)$. Individuals may also be entitled to income related to earnings
when working zero hours, for instance unemployment benefits, so we also predict un-
employment benefits for those who are working based on the *Official Yearbook of the
United Kingdom (1968-2001)*.

Labor supply is measured by a discrete variable that takes on three values: not
participating, working part-time and working full-time. Full time is defined as working
35 hours per week or more, and part-time is defined as 1 to 34 hours per week. The
choice of these ranges is based on the hours histograms in Figure 4, which suggests
a full-time definition of 35 hours a week or more. The average hours worked in the
part-time category is approximately 20 hours per week, and approximately 40 hours
per week in the full-time category.

In order to ensure consistency between the number of hours worked in each of
the three states and the corresponding consumption level we adopt the following
convention. If an individual is observed to be working either part-time or full-time
we use the reported number of hours to measure labor supply and usual take home
pay in constructing the consumption. In cases for which we do not observe the labor
supply state, we calculate after tax earnings based on 20 hours for the part-time choice
and 40 hours for the full-time choice. Constructing individual consumption in this
way ensures our measure of total private consumption in the household is consistent
with that observed in the data.

Likely candidates for the distribution factors are the wife’s potential share of total
household labor income \((w_{i}^{f}/(w_{i}^{f} + w_{i}^{m}))\), the local sex ratio (Seitz, 2004), and an
index of the generosity to the wife of local divorce legislation (Chiappori, Fortin, and
Lacroix, 2002). At present, we consider the wife’s share of potential labor earnings,
presented in Figure 3, and the age gap between spouses as distribution factors in
estimation.

4.2 Econometric Specification

The model of Section 3.3 can be estimated using a multinomial logit under the as-
sumption that the disturbances \(\varepsilon_{ih}\) are independent and identically distributed type
I extreme value. Let $d^g_{ih}$ denote an indicator equal to 1 if individual $i$ makes labor supply choice $h$ and zero otherwise. The contribution of individual $i$ to the likelihood function is the probability of observing individual $i$ making labor force decision $h$, which has the form:

$$
Pr(d^g_{ih} = 1) = Pr(u^g_{ih} > u^g_{ij}, \forall j \neq h; j, h \in \{0, 1, \ldots, H\}) \frac{\exp(v^g(L_{ih}, C_{ih}; X_i, z_i))}{\sum_{j=0}^{H} \exp(v^g(L_{ij}, C_{ij}; X_i, z_i))}.
$$

In estimation, heterogeneity in preferences for leisure is introduced through the vector $X$ which includes age, birth cohort, education, marital status, region, and quarter and year to control for seasonality and cyclical effects.\(^{18}\) The parameters $\Pi^g_l$ and $\Pi^g_{ll}$ are assumed to be linear functions of the observed characteristics so that, with a slight abuse of notation, for individual $i$ we have

$$
\Pi^g_l = X_i \tilde{\Pi}^g_l \quad \Pi^g_{ll} = X_i \tilde{\Pi}^g_{ll}.
$$

Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate a selection-corrected wage equation and predict wages for individuals that are not working. Second, we estimate the discrete labor supply choice, treating wages as known.

## 5 Estimation Results

We begin with estimates of the sharing rule parameters, the parameters that allow us to infer the share of consumption attributed to each adult in the household. As discussed in Section 3.3, with quadratic utility and under the assumption that the marginal utility of private consumption is the same for married and single individuals, we can construct each of the sharing rule parameters in four different ways from estimates of the reduced form. The sharing rule parameters recovered from the reduced form estimates for two specifications of the model are presented in Table 2.

\(^{18}\)In order to break the collinearity between age, birth cohort and year we follow Deaton (1997) and transform the year dummy variables so that the coefficients are orthogonal to a time trend and sum to zero over the period 1968 to 2001.
The first column of the table presents estimation results from the case in which the only distribution factor is the share of women’s potential earnings in household potential earnings. The second column presents results from a model where a second distribution factor, the age difference between spouses, is included.

The estimated sharing rule parameters constructed from the different model restrictions described by Equation 9 are qualitatively similar, remarkably so for men. In both specifications, the positive sign on $\phi_1$ indicates that an increase in the female’s share of potential earnings increases her share of total consumption in the household. The negative sign on $\phi_2$ suggests that the share of consumption women receive is decreasing in the relative age of their husbands. The sharing rule parameters for the second set of restrictions in Equation 9 are larger in absolute value for both the intercept and the distribution factors. Upon closer examination of the reduced form results, we find the reason for this difference across the estimates is due primarily to the fact that the estimated value of the denominator, $\Pi_{wly}$, is relatively small. This parameter captures the effect of the interaction between non-labor income and earnings for women on the labor supply decision. Since many women are not working, we need to impute earnings for 39% of the women in the data. Most of the information used to predict wages is also included directly in the reduced form model for hours; as a result, the predicted wage includes very little information. As a result, the parameter estimate is likely biased towards zero. It should be noted that this set of restrictions is less precise; as a result, it has less weight in the minimum distance estimation used to obtain the sharing rule estimates as discussed below.\(^{19}\)

The test statistics associated with several tests of the model restrictions are presented in the bottom five rows of Table 2. A Wald test on the model with one distribution factor rejects the full set of restrictions. The Wald test on the full set of restrictions from the model with two distribution factors, however, suggests the model is not strongly rejected. We subsequently test whether the sharing rule param-

\(^{19}\)For comparison purposes, we also estimated a version of the model where predicted wages were used in place of actual wages for all individuals and found no substantial changes in the parameter estimates. Results are available from the authors upon request.
eters estimated from the restrictions within gender are the same. The test statistics, presented in Rows 2 and 3 of the bottom panel of Table 2, indicate the within gender restrictions are not rejected by the data. We also test whether each of the individual restrictions from the female’s problem are consistent with the corresponding restrictions from the male’s problem in Rows 4 and 5. In each case, the test statistics indicate the model restrictions are not rejected at conventional significance levels. Overall, the test statistics provide some support for our version of the collective model.

We next compute consistent estimates of the sharing rule parameters from the unrestricted estimates by minimizing the distance between the reduced form and structural parameters, using the estimated covariance matrix from the reduced form to construct the weighting matrix. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 3.\textsuperscript{20} The estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the share of potential earnings attributed to the wife results in a 16% increase in the share of non-labor income she receives. This result is consistent with an increase in the wife’s threat point within a bargaining model. The estimate of $\phi_2$ indicates that an increase in the husband’s age by 1 year results in a 0.4% decrease in the wife’s share of non-labor income. While small in magnitude, this finding suggests that older spouses tend to have more bargaining power in marriage.

5.1 Adult Equivalence Scales Revisited

One of the main goals of this paper is to determine whether measures of consumption inequality using standard adult equivalence scales provide an accurate estimate of consumption inequality across individuals. Recall, adult equivalence scales assume that husbands and wives share in household consumption equally. In this section we determine the conditions under which our model would yield the same measures of consumption inequality as measures using adult equivalence scales. We set the age difference between spouses to the average age difference in the data. We then use the sharing rule estimates to determine what value of the female’s share in potential

\textsuperscript{20}See the Appendix for further details on the minimum distance estimation exercise.
household earnings satisfies:

\[
\frac{1}{2} = \hat{\phi}_0 + \hat{\phi}_1 \cdot \frac{w_f}{w_f + w_m} + \hat{\phi}_2 \cdot (2.09).
\]

Using estimates for \(\hat{\phi}_0\), \(\hat{\phi}_1\), and \(\hat{\phi}_2\) of \(-0.31\), \(1.59\), and \(-0.004\) respectively yields 51%. In other words, the model predicts that consumption is split equally across the husband and wife when they have the same earnings!\(^{21}\) It is worth emphasizing that this result is derived not from a model in which equal sharing is assumed: the only assumptions imposed in estimation are that households make Pareto efficient decisions, that public consumption is separable from private consumption, and that the marginal utility from private consumption is the same when single as when married.

### 5.2 Sensitivity Analysis

In this section, we consider the sensitivity of our results to both the sample used to estimate the model and the robustness of our estimation results to several modifications. First, we consider whether the trend in inequality measured in the literature for the entire population differs from the trend for our sample of one- and two-person households. Upon examination of Figure 5, we see that the trends in between household inequality using adult equivalence scales are virtually the same across samples. Thus, it does not appear that our results are driven exclusively by trends in inequality that are unique to our sample. That said, we are not able to say how the trends in within household consumption inequality vary between our sample and the entire population without estimating an extended version of our model.

With regards to robustness of our estimated results, the first check we consider is whether the results are sensitive to our definitions of public and private consumption. We first estimate the model under the assumption that there are no public goods and then sequentially add housing, heat and lighting, household durables, transport and services to public good consumption.\(^{22}\) The results of this exercise are reported in

\(^{21}\)To be precise, husbands and wives will split consumption equally when they have approximately the same wages and hours.

\(^{22}\)Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
Table 4. With the exception of the zero public goods case, the parameter estimates are quite robust across specifications: an increase in the wife’s share of potential household earnings of 10% results in an increase in her consumption share of between 12% and 17%. Under the most restrictive assumption, that no goods are public in the household, the model predicts women receive 40% of the consumption in households where both spouses choose the same hours of work and have the same wage. As the fraction of public goods in household expenditures increases, women receive a greater share of consumption. This result reflects, in part, the fact that a larger portion of consumption in the household is public and is thus split equally across spouses.

The next specification we estimate allows for differences in the sharing rule parameters for each birth cohort in our pooled sample. The sample covers a long time period and a wide age range in every year; we thus estimate sharing rules for each ten-year cohort in the data. The parameter estimates are presented in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 for the models with one distribution factor and two distribution factors, respectively. With the exception of the 1900 and 1960 birth cohorts (which have relatively small samples), the parameter estimates and the predicted share of consumption assigned to wives when earnings are equal across spouses are quite similar across the cohorts. For the cohorts between 1910 and 1950, an increase in the wife’s share of potential household earnings increases her share of non-labor income between 13% and 23% and the estimated effect of an increase in the husband’s age by one year fall within the range of −0.6% and 0.5%. The fact that the sharing rule parameter estimates are quite similar across specifications is surprising considering the possibility of large changes in divorce costs and gains to marriage over time.

The final robustness check we perform is to add unobserved heterogeneity in preferences to the model. We do this for two reasons. First, we want to allow for the possibility that the preference shocks are correlated across labor supply choices. Second, we want to allow for additional flexibility in estimating preferences over leisure.\footnote{We specify $\Pi_l = X_i \tilde{\Pi}_l + u_{hi}$ and $\Pi_h = X_i \tilde{\Pi}_hl + u_{hhi}$, with $u_{hi} \sim N(0, \sigma_{h_i}^2)$ and $u_{hhi} \sim N(0, \sigma_{hhi}^2)$}

Results from this specification for the model with one distribution factor are presented
in Column 3 of Table 5. Incorporating unobserved preference heterogeneity appears to reduce both $\phi_0$ and $\phi_1$ slightly but does not change the implications of the model. In particular, the effect of a 10% increase in potential household earnings attributed to wives results in an increased transfer of between 11% and 21% for the 1910 to 1950 cohorts, which is close to the range reported in Column 1 above.

6 Consumption Inequality

In this section, we compare the inequality measure implied by our model to a conventional measure of consumption inequality. For the purposes of this analysis, we use estimates of the model with two distribution factors and no unobserved preference heterogeneity to construct our benchmark sharing rule.\footnote{See Column 2 of Table 3.} We use this sharing rule to divide non-labor income between the husband and wife in each household. We subsequently construct private consumption based on the individuals’ share of non-labor income and his or her personal net labor earnings, where private consumption is constructed as in equations (4) and (5). Our sharing rule measure of individual consumption, for married individuals, is then equal to individual private consumption plus household public consumption:

$$C^f = w^f(l_h) + \left[\hat{\phi}_0 + \hat{\phi}_1 \frac{w^f(1)}{w^f(1) + w^m(1)} + \hat{\phi}_2(\text{age}_m - \text{age}_f)\right] \cdot y + P$$

and

$$C^m = w^m(l_h) + \left[1 - \hat{\phi}_0 - \hat{\phi}_1 \frac{w^f(1)}{w^f(1) + w^m(1)} - \hat{\phi}_2(\text{age}_m - \text{age}_f)\right] \cdot y + P.$$

Single individuals consume their entire labor and non-labor income. For comparison purposes, we construct another measure of individual consumption, equal division, which assumes that all consumption is divided equally between the husband and wife.

\footnote{See Train (2003)). The contribution to the likelihood function then becomes

$$\Pr(d_{ih} = 1) = \int \int \frac{\exp(v^g(L_{ih}, C_{ih}; X_i, z_i, u_{hi}, u_{hhi}))}{\sum_{j=0}^{H} \exp(v^g(L_{ij}, c_{ij}; X_i, z_i, u_{hi}, u_{hhi}))} dF(u_{hi})dF(u_{hhi}),$$

which does not have a closed form solution, but can be estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood.}
In the equal division case, individual consumption is calculated as household public consumption plus one half of household private consumption. In both the sharing rule and the equal division case, we double count public consumption. This accomplishes the same end as using an equivalence scale to assign household consumption to individual members.\footnote{It should be noted that the correlation between our equal division consumption inequality measure and a measure of inequality using equivalence scales is 0.99.}

Having constructed these two measures of individual consumption, we can construct a time series of inequality measures and decompose them into changes in between and within household inequality. While the Gini coefficient is a well known and widely used inequality index, it does not allow overall inequality to be exactly decomposed into within and between group contributions. As this is one of the main objectives of this paper we also compute the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD)\footnote{The MLD is a member of the Generalized Entropy Class, the only class of additively decomposable inequality indices (Shorrocks, 1984).} in consumption, defined as

\[
I_\alpha(C) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \log \left( \frac{\mu_C}{C_i} \right),
\]

where $\mu_C$ is the mean level of consumption. The index of total inequality using the MLD can be additively decomposed into within and between household inequality:

\[
I_\alpha^T(C) = I_\alpha^W(C) + I_\alpha^B(C),
\]

where $I_\alpha^W(C)$ is within household inequality and $I_\alpha^B(C)$ is between household inequality. Under the assumption of equal division, within household inequality is zero; therefore, we can calculate $I_\alpha^B(C)$ by using equal division. Using individual consumption constructed with the sharing rule we obtain the total inequality index $I_\alpha^T(C)$. We can then recover intra-household inequality using Equation (11).

### 6.1 Between and Within Household Consumption Inequality

The time-series trend of total and between household inequality for the years 1968 to 2001 is presented in Figure 6. The Gini index measures are presented in the first
panel, and the MLD measures of inequality are presented in the second panel. Inequality was stable from 1968 to 1980 at which time it increased substantially until around 1990, and has been falling slightly from 1990 through 2001. Of particular interest are two findings. First, ignoring intra-household inequality underestimates consumption inequality in 1968 substantially. This is due to the large differences in earnings between husbands and wives in 1968, differences that translate into an unequal distribution of consumption in the household. It is not surprising that our measure of inequality in 1968 is higher than the conventional measure: by definition, taking within household inequality into account will increase total inequality. However, the magnitude of the difference is striking: consumption inequality, as measured using adult equivalence scales, is underestimated by approximately 30% (15%) when inequality is measured using the MLD (Gini index). To put this figure into perspective, the difference between the level of inequality in 1968 using our measure of inequality compared to the conventional measure is as large as the entire increase in inequality between 1968 and 2001.

Second, the rise in consumption inequality under equal division, or between household inequality, may be over-stated by as much as 65%, as illustrated by the trend in the MLD presented in Figure 7. The reason our measure of inequality is so different from the equal division measure is due to the large fall in within-household inequality. The stylized facts presented in Section 2 point to the two main reasons for the decline in within household inequality: the fall in the gender wage gap and the rise in female labor supply. As women’s wages rose and as married women increased their labor supply, the share of income contributed to the household by the wife increased. The share of consumption allocated to wives increased accordingly.

Consider the distribution of consumption inferred from our model for 1968 and 2001 in Figure 8. The dispersion in within household inequality decreased between 1968 and 2001. The fact that there was a high degree of dispersion in 1968 was a major contributor to the high level of inequality at the beginning of the sample period. Despite the fall in dispersion, the righthand panel of Figure 8 shows that there is still
a substantial deviation from equal division by 2001. Incorporating within household inequality thus changes the picture of inequality dramatically.

6.2 Accounting for the trends in consumption inequality

In this section, we examine several explanations for the rise in consumption inequality observed in the data. We focus on the years 1978 to 2001, as the major changes in inequality occurred over the 1980s. Results are presented in Table 6. The first two rows contain the benchmark inequality measures for 1978 and 2001, followed by the absolute change over time in the third row. The rest of the table presents the percentage of the change in the observed inequality measures attributed to each explanation we consider.

6.2.1 Wages and Labor Supply

According to the stylized facts, two of the most salient trends over time are the closing of the gender gap in wages and the rise in female labor supply. To what extent do changes in the distribution of wages account for the rise in consumption inequality? To answer this question, we conduct two exercises. First, we re-weight the data for 1978 so that the wage distribution in 1978 matches that of 2001. This experiment captures the fall in the gender wage gap and aggregate changes in the wage distribution, but not changes in sorting on wages within households. In the second experiment we re-weight the joint spousal distribution of wages to capture the effect of sorting on inequality. Both experiments are subsequently repeated for labor supply. The results are presented in Table 6.

What is interesting about the results on wage and hours sorting is that they can simultaneously explain both the rise in consumption inequality across households and the fall in consumption inequality within households: sorting on wages alone can explain approximately 39% of the rise in between household inequality and 78% of the

\[27\] In particular, we construct histograms of log wages for 1978 and 2001. The histograms used to re-weight the wage distributions have 10 bins each. We re-weight 1978 data so that the histograms of log wages are the same in both years.
fall in within household inequality. With respect to sorting on hours, 32% of the rise in between household inequality and 98% of the fall in within household inequality can be explained by increased sorting within marriage. Regardless of the measure of consumption inequality considered, the exercises conducted above illuminate the dramatic role of sorting in determining the distribution of consumption across individuals.\textsuperscript{28}

### 6.2.2 Demographics and Household Composition

Next, we consider the hypothesis that the rise in consumption inequality is capturing cohort effects due to the changes in the age structure of the population. To this end, we re-weight the 1978 data so that the age structure is the same as that in 2001, holding all else constant. The results of this exercise, presented in the fifth row of the bottom panel of Table 6, suggest that changes in the age distribution between 1978 and 2001 had virtually no effect on consumption inequality.

The second explanation we consider is the large change in household composition that occurred alongside the rise in inequality. In particular, with delays in marriage and a rise in divorce rates, the fraction of households with one adult increased relative to the fraction of two adult households.\textsuperscript{29} To assess the importance of changing household composition, we re-weight the 1978 data so that the fraction of married couples, the fraction of single women, and the fraction of single men in the population match the proportions in 2001. The results of this exercise suggest that changes in household composition can explain up to 17% of the change in household inequality according to the sharing rule estimates and 16% of the change in consumption inequality when measured using adult equivalence scales. Together, a combination of

\textsuperscript{28}The compression of marginal tax rates also appear to have played a role in generating the sharp rise in between household inequality during the 1980s. The top and bottom marginal tax rates are plotted in Figure 9, where the top marginal rate falls from 83 per cent in 1978 to 60 per cent in 1979, and then falls again to 40 per cent in 1988. The increase in between household consumption inequality is closely linked to the increase in after tax income inequality that occurred over the 1980s. It appears that changes in marginal tax rates had the effect of increasing between household inequality substantially while having only a modest effect on within household inequality.

\textsuperscript{29}Although single person households have no within household inequality by definition, it is still the case that there may exist substantial inequality between single adult households.
a changing age distribution and the change in household composition over time can explain 16% of the change in the MLD over time, most of this effect coming through household composition. In summary, our experiments indicate that the main driving force behind the trends in consumption inequality are changes in marital sorting, not changes in demographics. This finding reaffirms the fact that our understanding of consumption inequality is incomplete when intra-household behavior is ignored.

7 Conclusion

The literature on consumption inequality has focussed on the question of how changes in income inequality translate into changes in consumption inequality at the level of the individual. In this paper, we show that current measures of consumption inequality only reflect inequality at the household level, as it is assumed there is no inequality within households. We provide evidence that this assumption produces a very inaccurate picture of both the level and trend in consumption inequality for two reasons. First, the large dispersion in incomes in the household are highly inconsistent with equal division of consumption. When equal division is relaxed, there is substantial inequality within the household. This suggests previous work underestimates the level of individual consumption inequality by 30%. Second, the earnings gap within households has closed over the past 30 years, resulting in less inequality in the household over time. As a result, we estimate that the rise in inequality documented in the literature is overstated by 65%. Our results show that the conventional approach for measuring inequality is only appropriate for measuring inequality for single individuals and for couples with exactly the same earnings.

Our work highlights the fact that looking inside the household is as important as looking between households for the study of consumption inequality across individuals. Ignoring what happens in the household not only changes our estimates of the level and trend in inequality; it also changes our understanding of the forces behind the trends. We find that increased marital sorting on earnings can explain both the fall in within household inequality and the rise in between household inequality over
time. These results are complementary to those of Fernández and Rogerson (2001), among others, on sorting and income inequality and suggest an important avenue for further research.
References


A Minimum Distance Estimator of Structural Parameters

The structural parameters

\[ \theta = \left( \phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2, \alpha_{cl}^f, \alpha_{cc}^f, \alpha_{cl}^m, \alpha_{cc}^m, \alpha_{IX}, \alpha_{IX}^m, \beta_{f}^c, \beta_{m}^c \right)^\top \]

can be consistently estimated by using a minimum distance estimator (MDE) (see Chamberlain (1984)). We define the MDE as

\[ \hat{\theta} = \arg \min_{\theta} \left( \hat{\Pi} - f(\theta) \right)^\top V^{-1} \left( \hat{\Pi} - f(\theta) \right), \]

where the function \( f \) imposes the structural restrictions on the reduced form, and \( V \) is the covariance matrix of the reduced form parameter estimates. For the case in which the sharing rule is a linear function of three distribution factors the structure of the model implies the following restrictions on the reduced form parameters:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\hat{\Pi}_{ly}^f &=& \alpha_{cl}^f \\
\hat{\Pi}_{lym}^f &=& \alpha_{cl}^f (\phi_0 - 1) \\
\hat{\Pi}_{z1lym}^f &=& \alpha_{cl}^f \phi_1 \\
\hat{\Pi}_{z2lym}^f &=& \alpha_{cl}^f \phi_2 \\
\hat{\Pi}_{ly}^m &=& \alpha_{cl}^m \\
\hat{\Pi}_{lym}^m &=& -\alpha_{cl}^m \phi_0 \\
\hat{\Pi}_{z1lym}^m &=& -\alpha_{cl}^m \phi_1 \\
\hat{\Pi}_{z2lym}^m &=& -\alpha_{cl}^m \phi_2 \\
\hat{\Pi}_{ly}^w &=& \alpha_{cc}^f \\
\hat{\Pi}_{lym}^w &=& -\alpha_{cc}^m \phi_0 \\
\hat{\Pi}_{z1lym}^w &=& -\alpha_{cc}^m \phi_1 \\
\hat{\Pi}_{z2lym}^w &=& -\alpha_{cc}^m \phi_2 \\
\hat{\Pi}_{IX}^f &=& \alpha_{IX}^f \\
\hat{\Pi}_{IX}^m &=& \alpha_{IX}^m \\
\hat{\Pi}_{IX}^w &=& \alpha_{IX}^w \\
\hat{\Pi}_{IX}^m &=& \beta_{f}^c \\
\hat{\Pi}_{IX}^m &=& \beta_{m}^c 
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\( \hat{\theta} \) is distributed asymptotically normal as:

\[ \sqrt{n} \left( \hat{\theta} - \theta \right) \rightarrow_d N \left( 0, (G^\top V^{-1}G)^{-1} \right), \]

where \( G(\theta) = \frac{\partial f(\theta)}{\partial \theta} \).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics from the FES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th>1968 to 2001</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (22 to 65)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1968 to 2001</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No hours dummy</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part time dummy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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<td>Full time dummy</td>
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<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hourly wage</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>1.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Expend.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>118.37</td>
<td>99.10</td>
<td>192.51</td>
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<td>99.53</td>
<td>75.63</td>
<td>192.51</td>
<td>129.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing Expend.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39.57</td>
<td>41.62</td>
<td>59.61</td>
<td>62.93</td>
<td>39.07</td>
<td>37.91</td>
<td>59.61</td>
<td>62.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,958</td>
<td>31,871</td>
<td>12,967</td>
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<td>20,291</td>
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Table 2: Unrestricted Estimates of the Sharing Rule.

<table>
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<th>One Distribution Factor</th>
<th>Two Distribution Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0^{fcl}$</td>
<td>$\Pi_{fcl}^{f} / \Pi_{fcl}^{y} + 1$</td>
<td>$-0.534$ ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0^{fcc}$</td>
<td>$\Pi_{fcc}^{f} / \Pi_{fcc}^{y} + 1$</td>
<td>$-1.707$ ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.536)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0^{mcl}$</td>
<td>$-\Pi_{mcl}^{m} / \Pi_{mcl}^{y}$</td>
<td>$-0.393$ ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0^{mcc}$</td>
<td>$-\Pi_{mcc}^{m} / \Pi_{mcc}^{y}$</td>
<td>$-0.327$ **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1^{fcl}$</td>
<td>$\Pi_{fcl}^{f} / \Pi_{fcl}^{y}$</td>
<td>$2.297$ ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1^{fcc}$</td>
<td>$\Pi_{fcc}^{f} / \Pi_{fcc}^{y}$</td>
<td>$5.796$ ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.687)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1^{mcl}$</td>
<td>$-\Pi_{mcl}^{m} / \Pi_{mcl}^{y}$</td>
<td>$1.714$ ***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\phi_1^{mcc}$</td>
<td>$-\Pi_{mcc}^{m} / \Pi_{mcc}^{y}$</td>
<td>$1.635$ ***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
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<td>$\phi_2^{fcl}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\phi_2^{fcc}$</td>
<td>$\Pi_{fcc}^{f} / \Pi_{fcc}^{y}$</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_2^{mcc}$</td>
<td>$-\Pi_{mcc}^{m} / \Pi_{mcc}^{y}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests | df | $\chi^2$ | p-value | df | $\chi^2$ | p-value |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_f = \phi_m$</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19.49</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21.73</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_f^{fcl} = \phi_f^{fcc}$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_f^{mcl} = \phi_f^{mcc}$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_f^{mcl} = \phi_f^{mcc}$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_f^{mcl} = \phi_f^{mcc}$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The sharing rule has the form: $\phi = \phi_0 + \phi_1 \left( \frac{w_f}{w_f + w_m} \right) + \phi_2 (age_m - age_f)$. Each sharing rule parameter ($\phi_0$, $\phi_1$, and $\phi_2$) can be recovered from the restrictions on the reduced form estimates in equation 9. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Table 3: Minimum Distance Sharing Rule Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0$</td>
<td>-0.317</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>1.584</td>
<td>1.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Sharing Rule Estimates Under Alternative Measures of Public Goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Public Goods</th>
<th>Public Goods (i)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0$</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>1.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2}\phi_1$</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Consumption</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | Public Goods (ii) | Public Goods (iii)          |
|                      | (i + heat)        | (ii + durables)             |
| $\phi_0$             | -0.239           | -0.317                     |
|                      | (0.027)          | (0.015)                    |
| $\phi_1$             | 1.352            | 1.584                      |
|                      | (0.071)          | (0.013)                    |
| $\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2}\phi_1$ | 0.437          | 0.475                      |
|                      | (0.015)          | (0.010)                    |
| % of Total Consumption | 24%            | 33%                        |

|                      | Public Goods (iv) | Public Goods (v)           |
|                      | (iii + transport) | (iv + services)            |
| $\phi_0$             | -0.310           | -0.256                     |
|                      | (0.013)          | (0.008)                    |
| $\phi_1$             | 1.665            | 1.562                      |
|                      | (0.038)          | (0.025)                    |
| $\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2}\phi_1$ | 0.523          | 0.525                      |
|                      | (0.010)          | (0.007)                    |
| % of Total Consumption | 47%            | 56%                        |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Minimum Distance Sharing Rule Estimates by Birth Cohort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth Cohort</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>Birth Cohort</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900 $\phi_0$</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>-0.173</td>
<td>-0.260</td>
<td>1940 $\phi_0$</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N: 3,134$</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>$N: 15,284$</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>1.474</td>
<td>1.487</td>
<td>1.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 $\phi_0$</td>
<td>-0.379</td>
<td>-0.347</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>1950 $\phi_0$</td>
<td>-0.361</td>
<td>-0.348</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N: 12,211$</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>$N: 11,692$</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>1.799</td>
<td>1.650</td>
<td>1.135</td>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>1.738</td>
<td>1.746</td>
<td>1.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.228)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 $\phi_0$</td>
<td>-0.591</td>
<td>-0.568</td>
<td>-0.471</td>
<td>1960 $\phi_0$</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N: 18,660$</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>$N: 7,974$</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>2.325</td>
<td>2.303</td>
<td>2.067</td>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 $\phi_0$</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>1970 $\phi_0$</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N: 16,219$</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>$N: 2,585$</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td>1.330</td>
<td>1.071</td>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>1.210</td>
<td>0.703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(0.613)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>$\phi_0 + \frac{1}{2} \phi_1$</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. N indicates the sample size for each birth cohort. Column 3 contains estimates allowing for unobserved preference heterogeneity for leisure based on 100 random draws. The covariance matrix of the reduced form estimates is based on the numerical Hessian for column 1 and 2 and on the outer product of the gradient for column 3.
Table 6: Decomposition of the Change in Between and Within Consumption Inequality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Gini Index</th>
<th>Mean Logarithmic Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of change attributable to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gini Index</th>
<th>Mean Logarithmic Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Sorting</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Supply</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Supply Sorting</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Distribution</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Composition</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age and Household</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: **Trends in the Gini index for earnings and consumption.**
Own calculations from the FES.

Figure 2: **Correlation in earnings across husbands and wives.**
Own calculations from the FES.
Figure 3: **Fraction of actual household earnings provided by wife.**  
Source: Own calculation from the FES.

Figure 4: **Histogram of usual weekly hours.**  
Source: Own calculation from the FES.
Figure 5: Consumption inequality for all households and one- and two-adult households.


Figure 6: Total and between household decomposition of consumption inequality trends.

Source: Own calculation from the FES.
Figure 7: Relative changes in between and within household inequality trends.

Source: Own calculation from the FES.

Figure 8: Distribution of consumption inequality within households.
Figure 9: **Bottom and top marginal tax rates.**  